Ethnicity and religion are not predetermined;
we are not born, do not possess an innate sense of ethnic or religious
affiliation, we become Yoruba, Christian, Hausa or Kataf largely as a
factor of geographical, ancestral, and societal influences.
Against this backdrop, it is ironic that in a substantial number of the 19 states that make up northern Nigeria, and indeed in the country as a whole, ethnicity and religion have become the primary factors that dictate how we (co)exist. Of course, the question of Nigeria's fragile unity has never been in doubt. But much as Nigeria is burdened with crises of ethnic and religious nature, the (near-clichéd) media characterization of 'largely northern Muslims and southern Christians' is anomalous and misleading, for the mere fact that both southern and northern Nigeria are multi-ethnic and multi-religious.
Moreover, the unity of the northern region as an entity in itself is arguably in a worse state than that of the country as a whole. It may, therefore, not be far-fetched to suggest that northern Nigeria, even though geographically homogeneous, is on a precarious cliff due to its continued and ever-widening heterogeneity, comprising of ethnic, religious and political dynamics, and that if left untended, will have national implications.
It is hard to recall a three or five-year period - since the famous anti-government and intra-religious riot that was led by the YanTatsine group in Kano State in the '80s - in which one or other settlement within northern Nigeria has not been consumed by ethno-religious strife. It is also one of nature's not so funny jokes that warring parties largely happen to be neatly divided along religious lines, and belong respectively to 'majority' (Hausa and Fulani and Muslim) and 'minority' (Kataf, Berom, etc. and Christian) ethnic groups. States like Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi and recently Plateau have been the traditional flag-bearers of the country's ethno-religious riots.
For instance, the riots that happened in Kano in 1982 and 1991 were largely caused by religious differences, the former to do with Muslim opposition to the reconstruction of a church in Fagge area of the state, and the latter, in objection to the invitation issued to a German Evangelist Reinhard Boonke to hold a Christian crusade in the state. It is worthy to note that Muslims primarily objected to the Christian crusade because they had been denied a chance to host the late Ahmed Deedat, a Muslim scholar from South Africa in Kano for an Islamic sermon. This of course led to loss of lives and destruction of property.
Against this backdrop, it is ironic that in a substantial number of the 19 states that make up northern Nigeria, and indeed in the country as a whole, ethnicity and religion have become the primary factors that dictate how we (co)exist. Of course, the question of Nigeria's fragile unity has never been in doubt. But much as Nigeria is burdened with crises of ethnic and religious nature, the (near-clichéd) media characterization of 'largely northern Muslims and southern Christians' is anomalous and misleading, for the mere fact that both southern and northern Nigeria are multi-ethnic and multi-religious.
Moreover, the unity of the northern region as an entity in itself is arguably in a worse state than that of the country as a whole. It may, therefore, not be far-fetched to suggest that northern Nigeria, even though geographically homogeneous, is on a precarious cliff due to its continued and ever-widening heterogeneity, comprising of ethnic, religious and political dynamics, and that if left untended, will have national implications.
It is hard to recall a three or five-year period - since the famous anti-government and intra-religious riot that was led by the YanTatsine group in Kano State in the '80s - in which one or other settlement within northern Nigeria has not been consumed by ethno-religious strife. It is also one of nature's not so funny jokes that warring parties largely happen to be neatly divided along religious lines, and belong respectively to 'majority' (Hausa and Fulani and Muslim) and 'minority' (Kataf, Berom, etc. and Christian) ethnic groups. States like Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi and recently Plateau have been the traditional flag-bearers of the country's ethno-religious riots.
For instance, the riots that happened in Kano in 1982 and 1991 were largely caused by religious differences, the former to do with Muslim opposition to the reconstruction of a church in Fagge area of the state, and the latter, in objection to the invitation issued to a German Evangelist Reinhard Boonke to hold a Christian crusade in the state. It is worthy to note that Muslims primarily objected to the Christian crusade because they had been denied a chance to host the late Ahmed Deedat, a Muslim scholar from South Africa in Kano for an Islamic sermon. This of course led to loss of lives and destruction of property.
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